Danger for Productive Power?

Danger for Productive Power?

◆Politics▤Oct 6, 20264 min read
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Oct 6, 2026

Barnett & Duvall: Satellites Challenging Productive Power

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall are among the most cited voices in IR when it comes to the concept of power. In “Power in International Politics” (2005), they argue against reducing power to military strength or material resources. Their framework distinguishes several forms of power and shows that power also works through institutions, social structures and the production of meaning. The appeal of this approach is that it covers more than open coercion. It also captures the quieter ways in which actors and structures shape rules, social roles and the frames through which we make sense of politics.

Productive power is the form most relevant here. It refers to the way social subjects, categories and understandings are constituted through knowledge, discourse and shared practices. It shows up wherever actors decide what counts as legitimate, normal or credible. It rarely works through force. Instead, it operates through the production and circulation of meaning: through media, selective information, official narratives and collective identities (cf. Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 56).

Private satellite companies are not the source of productive power in this sense. What they can do is change the conditions under which it operates. When journalists, researchers and the public gain access to independent imagery, a state loses some of its control over how events are interpreted. Satellite images then become more than data. They become part of the struggle over what a political event means.

The Bucha Massacre

Since the full-scale Russian attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, warfare on social media and online platforms has introduced a new way of mediatizing war. (…) the war in Ukraine represents the most personalized war in history (cited in Näslund and Reichert, 2024, p. 7).

The quotation refers to social networks and online platforms, but the point extends to commercial satellite imagery as well. Reporting on Bucha is a clear example.

Bucha, a town of about 36,000 people some 30 kilometres from Kyiv, was occupied by Russian troops from early March until the end of March 2022. When Ukrainian forces returned, they found evidence of killings of civilians, and there were reports of torture and executions. The most visible sign was the bodies of civilians lying in the streets (cf. Doyle, 2022).

The Russian Ministry of Defence denied any responsibility. According to its statement, no resident had been harmed by Russian forces, and the photos and videos had been staged by Ukraine after the withdrawal. Moscow presented the events as a provocation (cf. Gulka, 2022).

Satellite imagery from the U.S. company Maxar Technologies undermined this account. The New York Times and Reuters compared the images with later street-level footage. Their conclusion: objects consistent with human bodies were visible on Yablunska Street from mid-March onwards, while Bucha was still under Russian control (cf. Browne et al., 2022). One widely shared image showed bodies along the street in the same positions as in mobile-phone videos recorded after the withdrawal. This directly contradicted the core of the Russian narrative, namely that the scene was staged after Russian troops had left.

What matters for this paper is less the documentation of possible war crimes than the challenge to Russia’s interpretive authority. Moscow tried to reframe the deaths in public. The satellite images gave international media an independent basis for establishing when the bodies appeared and, by implication, who was in control at the time. The contest was over timeline and causality, and here the imagery proved decisive.

This should not be overstated, though. Satellite images do not speak for themselves. They need expert interpretation, and it is the companies that decide which images are released and to whom. The independence of this evidence is therefore relative.

Consequences for Authoritarian Regimes

The case matters most for regimes whose legitimacy rests on tight control over public narratives. Commercial space companies do not have to pursue political goals for this to happen. Simply by making imagery available to journalists, researchers and civil society, they enable forms of verification that a state cannot easily suppress.

An exploratory interview with one of the authors of the edited volume Strategischer Wettbewerb im Weltraum (ed. Nötzold, 2024) points in the same direction. The expert’s central observation was:

“The more authoritarian a state is, the more consequential the availability of information through satellite internet becomes for its interpretive sovereignty.” (exploratory expert interview with V. Stosic; own translation)

Strictly speaking, the expert refers to satellite internet rather than satellite imagery. The two work differently: one provides access to information, the other produces new evidence. Both, however, weaken a state’s monopoly on interpretation. The argument of this section can therefore be extended: the more authoritarian a regime, the more vulnerable it is to any satellite-based source of information it does not control.

References

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