Starlink Goes to War

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The Cyberattack on Viasat and Its Consequences

The space sector has undergone a fundamental transformation in recent years: away from purely state-dominated programs (“Old Space”) and toward a dynamic commercial market often referred to as “NewSpace.” Following the U.S. model of increasingly relying on private providers, Ukraine also benefited at the outset of Russia’s war of aggression from close cooperation with the private space sector. By acting as a customer, the Ukrainian government gained access to cutting-edge commercial satellite networks without having to bear the immense development costs of building its own infrastructure. However, what appeared strategically advantageous in peacetime quickly turned into a significant vulnerability once the war began (cf. Pearson et al., 2022).

On February 24, 2022 - just one hour before the start of the Russian ground invasion - Russia launched a large-scale cyberattack targeting satellite-enabled communications. The aim was to immediately impair the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian military (cf. EUREPOC, 2023). Russian forces deliberately attacked the commercially operated communications satellite “KA-SAT 9A,” which was used by Ukrainian authorities and armed forces to ensure critical digital communications in the event of an attack (cf. Przetacznik & Tarpova, 2022).

Because the satellite belongs to the U.S. company Viasat and provides service to numerous civilian customers across Europe, the effects were not confined to the battlefield. At the same time that Ukrainian communication networks failed, around 5,800 wind turbines operated by the German manufacturer Enercon - also managed via this satellite link—were reportedly disabled (cf. Kerttunen, Schuck, & Hemmelskamp, 2023). The incident illustrates how closely civilian space-based infrastructure is now intertwined with military operations. Victor Zhora, deputy head of Ukraine’s cybersecurity service, described the outage as a “really huge loss in communications in the very beginning of war” (cited in O’Neill, 2022).

Starlink’s Power Structure

In this critical phase, another private actor moved to the center of attention: SpaceX and its satellite network Starlink. Even before the invasion, Ukraine had negotiated with Elon Musk’s company about the provision of internet services, but the official operating license had not yet been granted (cf. Abels, 2024). Immediately after the outbreak of war, Kyiv issued this approval on an accelerated basis.

In a widely publicized appeal, Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov addressed Elon Musk directly via X (formerly Twitter):

@elonmusk, while you try to colonize Mars — Russia try to occupy Ukraine! While your rockets successfully land from space — Russian rockets attack Ukrainian civil people! We ask you to provide Ukraine with Starlink stations and to address sane Russians to stand. (Fedorov, 2022).

Musk responded quickly. Within a few days, the first terminals arrived. By the end of 2024, according to Ukrainian figures, around 42,000 terminals were in operation - distributed across the military, hospitals, and humanitarian organizations (cf. Bandouil, 2025). Starlink rapidly became a backbone of Ukraine’s defense. The key technological advantage lies in its use of Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Satellites in LEO enable extremely low signal delay (latency), which supports a new kind of real-time connectivity that can be operationally decisive in modern warfare (cf. Wiedemar, 2024).

Ukraine’s armed forces subsequently developed specialized "command-and-information systems" designed specifically to function via Starlink. One example is “GIS Arta,” which aggregates sensor data from drones, smartphones, and satellites in order to transmit adversary positions to Ukrainian units in real time. Combined with the extensive use of drones (UAVs), this produced substantial tactical efficiencies: an estimated 70% of damaged or destroyed Russian systems in the third year of the war have been attributed to Ukrainian drone strikes - operations that would be difficult to sustain without stable Starlink connectivity (cf. Watling & Reynolds, 2025).

At the same time, this military use created tensions with SpaceX. Company leadership emphasized that the technology was intended for humanitarian and civilian purposes, not for active offensive operations. Gwynne Shotwell, President of SpaceX, later confirmed that the company had taken measures to restrict Starlink’s use for controlling offensive weapon systems:

“There are things that we can do to limit their ability to do that (…) things that we can do, and have done” (cited in Lyngaas, 2023).

This points to a novel security-policy dilemma: the defensive capacity of an entire state can become heavily dependent on the decisions of a single private company and its owner. Since there is currently no fully comparable alternative network—Europe’s “IRIS²” is not expected to be operational before 2027—SpaceX holds an almost monopolistic position. With more than 60% of all active satellites in orbit, a private actor controls what can become the digital lifeline of a modern conflict (cf. Abels, 2024).




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